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A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization

Author

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  • Roger B. Myerson

    (Department of Economics University of Chicago, Chicago)

Abstract

The U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Bremer's My Year in Iraq, and Xenophon's Education of Cyrus all consider problems of establishing a state. Bremer sees constitutions as fundamental, and the Field Manual emphasizes local security operations and effective governance to establish legitimacy. But Xenophon shows how states are founded by leaders with reputations for reliably rewarding supporters. Agency incentive problems in government make patronage an essential aspect of state-building, and political leaders become fundamentally constrained by their reputations. Democratic competition requires many leaders to develop independent reputations for exercising power and patronage responsibly, which can be encouraged by political decentralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 2009. "A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(3), pages 470-482, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:3:p:470-482
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709333356
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
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    3. Myerson, Roger B., 2006. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 3-23, January.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 2008. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 125-139, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2019. "The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse," Papers 1911.09681, arXiv.org.

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