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The Terrorist Endgame

Author

Listed:
  • Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

    (Department of Political Science, Washington University)

Abstract

The author models the relationship between a government and former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard and learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists’ ability and skill at providing counterterrorism aid. The government has the option—after observing the success or failure of counterterrorism—of replacing the former terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner. This study demonstrates that the threat of replacement, in addition to promised concessions, provides incentives for former terrorists to exert counterterrorism effort, particularly when the potential replacements are of moderate ability. Furthermore, the author identifies conditions under which governments are likely to replace the former-terrorist leadership with which it has been negotiating. The model also has implications for the effect of counterterrorism successes on future concessions and the impact of the government’s ability to consider replacing the former terrorists on concessions and counterterrorism.

Suggested Citation

  • Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 2005. "The Terrorist Endgame," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 237-258, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:237-258
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272193
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edlin, Aaron S. & Shannon, Chris, 1998. "Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 201-219, July.
    2. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
    3. Kydd, Andrew & Walter, Barbara F., 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 263-296, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stranlund, John K. & Field, Barry C., 2006. "On the Production of Homeland Security Under True Uncertainty," Working Paper Series 14505, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.

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