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Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis

Author

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  • Michael P. Leidy
  • Robert W. Staiger

    (Department of Economics, University of Michigan)

Abstract

This article reviews the recent contributions of economic analysis to the literature concerned with the process of national arms accumulation and the potential for arms control and disarmament. The role of formal model building as an aid to understanding the armament process is discussed. The existing economic literature in this area is organized and reviewed on the basis of the different modeling approaches that have been explored to date. Finally, strands of economic thought that have not yet been introduced into the arms race literature are explored, with the purpose of suggesting further applications of the economic approach to this important area of analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael P. Leidy & Robert W. Staiger, 1985. "Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 503-530, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:29:y:1985:i:3:p:503-530
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029003006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Charles H. Anderton, 1989. "Arms Race Modeling," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(2), pages 346-367, June.
    2. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    3. Mark Irving Lichbach, 1990. "When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner's Dilemma?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 29-56, March.

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