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Individual Contributions for Collective Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Norman Frohlich

    (Department of Government University of Texas)

  • Thomas Hunt

    (Department of Government University of Texas)

  • Joe Oppenheimer

    (Department of Government University of Texas)

  • R.Harrisson Wagner

    (Department of Government University of Texas)

Abstract

There is a growing controversy as to what behavior is to be expected of individuals regarding contributions for the supply of collective goods. This paper attempts to settle some of the controversy. It attempts to do so not by showing that one of the positions taken is correct and the others wrong, but by showing that the various authors in question reach different conclusions about individual behavior in situations involving the potential supply of collective goods because they make different assumptions regarding the nature of the goods and the nature of the situations in which the individuals find themselves. The different conclusions are reconciled by a careful examination of the assumptions of the authors. Specific variables are identified which account for the differences in the models and a set of dimensions along which collective goods situations can vary is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Norman Frohlich & Thomas Hunt & Joe Oppenheimer & R.Harrisson Wagner, 1975. "Individual Contributions for Collective Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(2), pages 310-329, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:2:p:310-329
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:02:p:707-716_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Martin McGuire, 1974. "Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-126, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Nurmi, 1977. "Ways out of the Prisoner's Dilemma," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 135-165, June.
    2. Runge, C. Ford, 1981. "Institutions and Common Property Externalities: The Assurance Problem in Economic Development," Faculty and Alumni Dissertations 206835, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    3. Andreas P. Kyriacou, 2011. "Rational Irrationality and Group Size: The Effect of Biased Beliefs on Individual Contributions Towards Collective Goods," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 109-130, January.
    4. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. Gupta, Dipak K. & Hofstetter, C. Richard & Buss, Terry F., 1997. "Group utility in the micro motivation of collective action: The case of membership in the AARP," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 301-320, February.

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