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When Can an Employee Refuse Unsafe Work and Expect to Be Protected from Discipline? Evidence from Canada

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  • Mark Harcourt
  • Sondra Harcourt

Abstract

This paper examines 272 Canadian arbitration and labor relations board decisions involving employees who, when they refused work on the grounds that the work was unsafe, were disciplined by their employers. The authors' hypothesis is that boards treat the right to refuse unsafe work as secondary to management's right to manage. The results of the study confirm that the right to refuse was very restricted. Employees had to satisfy many rigid conditions to qualify for protection from discipline. These conditions appear to have been based on the notions that health and safety are properly management's prerogative and that obedience to management authority is essential to efficient production.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Harcourt & Sondra Harcourt, 2000. "When Can an Employee Refuse Unsafe Work and Expect to Be Protected from Discipline? Evidence from Canada," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 53(4), pages 684-703, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:53:y:2000:i:4:p:684-703
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390005300407
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, 1987. "The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(4), pages 543-555, July.
    2. Brian Bemmels, 1991. "Attribution Theory and Discipline Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 44(3), pages 548-562, April.
    3. Brian Bemmels, 1988. "Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 42(1), pages 63-76, October.
    4. Brian Bemmels, 1988. "The Effect of Grievants' Gender on Arbitrators' Decisions," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 41(2), pages 251-262, January.
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