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The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards

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  • Richard N. Block
  • Jack Stieber

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of attorney representation and the identity of the arbitrator on a sample of grievance arbitration awards in cases involving discharge for just cause. The results indicate that, as compared to cases in which neither side is represented by an attorney, each party has more favorable arbitration awards when it has attorney representation and the other party does not. When both sides have attorney representation, however, the awards do not differ from those given when neither side has attorney representation. The results also indicate that the awards of several of the arbitrators studied were consistently more favorable to one of the parties than the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, 1987. "The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(4), pages 543-555, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:40:y:1987:i:4:p:543-555
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    File URL: http://ilr.sagepub.com/content/40/4/543.abstract
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    Cited by:

    1. Ashenfelter, Orley & Bloom, David E. & Dahl, Gordon B., 2013. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Evidence from Long Run Play," IZA Discussion Papers 7245, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1990. "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    3. Nathalie Chappe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2013. "The Influence of Lawyers and Fee Arrangements on Arbitration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 720-738, December.
    4. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    5. Karen Mumford, 1996. "Arbitration and ACAS in Britain: a Historical Perspective," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 287-305, June.

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