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When legislators choose not to decide: Abstentions in the European Parliament

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  • Monika Mühlböck
  • Nikoleta Yordanova

Abstract

Why do legislators choose to vote ‘Abstain’ instead of ‘Yea’ or ‘Nay’? Is it because they shy away from taking sides when facing competing demands? We address this question by studying roll-call vote data on the sixth European Parliament. In line with our principal–agent approach, we find that Members of the European Parliament are prone to strategically abstain when torn between different positions of their national party, their transnational party group, and their country’s minister. Abstentions are thus not random but strategic and ignoring them may bias the findings of legislative studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Monika Mühlböck & Nikoleta Yordanova, 2017. "When legislators choose not to decide: Abstentions in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 323-336, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:2:p:323-336
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116517694369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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