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The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Rory Costello

    () (London School of Economics, UK)

  • Robert Thomson

    (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland)

Abstract

When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a 'two-level game', where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.

Suggested Citation

  • Rory Costello & Robert Thomson, 2011. "The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 337-357, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:337-357
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhlbock, Monika & Tosun, Jale, 2015. "Deciding over controversial issues: Voting behavior in the Council and the European Parliament on genetically modified organisms," GMCC-15: Seventh GMCC, November 17-20, 2015, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 211480, International Conference on Coexistence between Genetically Modified (GM) and non-GM based Agricultural Supply Chains (GMCC).
    2. Mühlböck, Monika and Berthold Rittberger, 2015. "The Council, the European Parliament, and the paradox of inter-institutional cooperation," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 19, January.

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