IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v12y2011i2p193-215.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Hertz

    (ETH Zürich, Switzerland, robin.hertz@eup.gess.ethz.ch)

  • Dirk Leuffen

    (University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

The article analyses how enlargements affect the speed of European Union (EU) decision-making. In line with rationalist theories of group choice, we argue that enlargements increase the costs of organizing decisions, i.e. transaction costs. Increasing transaction costs, in turn, slow down EU law-making. We test this theory by estimating Cox regression models that incorporate time-varying covariates on all directives, regulations and decisions submitted by the European Commission between 1976 and 2006. In contrast to previous analyses, we show that an increase in group size indeed slows down EU law-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Hertz & Dirk Leuffen, 2011. "Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 193-215, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:2:p:193-215
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116511399162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116511399162
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116511399162?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christina Zimmer & Gerald Schneider & Michael Dobbins, 2005. "The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 403-422, June.
    2. Fritz W. Scharpf, 2006. "The Joint‐Decision Trap Revisited," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 845-864, November.
    3. Torsten J. Selck, 2005. "Explaining the Absence of Inertia in European Union Legislative Decision‐making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 1055-1070, December.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    5. Fritz W. Scharpf, 2006. "The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 845-864, November.
    6. George Tsebelis & Xenophon Yataganas, 2002. "Veto Players and Decision‐making in the EU After Nice," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 283-307, June.
    7. Jonathan Golub & Bernard Steunenberg, 2007. "How Time Affects EU Decision-Making," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 555-566, December.
    8. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
    9. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    10. Golub, Jonathan, 1999. "In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 733-764, October.
    11. Christina Zimmer & Gerald Schneider & Michael Dobbins, 2005. "The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(2), pages 403-422, June.
    12. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jørgen Bølstad & James P. Cross, 2016. "Not all Treaties are Created Equal: The Effects of Treaty Changes on Legislative Efficiency in the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 793-808, July.
    2. Stefan Ćetković & Aron Buzogány, 2019. "The Political Economy of EU Climate and Energy Policies in Central and Eastern Europe Revisited: Shifting Coalitions and Prospects for Clean Energy Transitions," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(1), pages 124-138.
    3. Christina J. Schneider & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 58(1), pages 120-142, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frank M. Häge, 2007. "Committee Decision-making in the Council of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 299-328, September.
    2. Magnus Lundgren & Theresa Squatrito & Jonas Tallberg, 2018. "Stability and change in international policy-making: A punctuated equilibrium approach," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 547-572, December.
    3. Paul Schure & Amy Verdun, 2008. "Legislative Bargaining in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 459-486, December.
    4. Philippe van Gruisen, 2019. "The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 692-709, July.
    5. Manuele Citi & Mads Dagnis Jensen, 2022. "The Effects of Supranational Delegation on Policy Development," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 337-354, March.
    6. Christophe Crombez & Pieterjan Vangerven, 2014. "Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 289-308, June.
    7. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2012. "Party ideology and legislative agendas: Estimating contextual policy positions for the study of EU decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 604-625, December.
    8. Daniel Finke, 2009. "Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in Eu Treaty Negotiations," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 543-569, October.
    9. Deniz Aksoy, 2010. "Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 171-194, June.
    10. Heike Klüver & Iñaki Sagarzazu, 2013. "Ideological congruency and decision-making speed: The effect of partisanship across European Union institutions," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 388-407, September.
    11. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Fraser, Clive D., 2007. "Is the public sector too large in an economy with club goods? A case when consumers differ in both tastes and incomes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1018-1031, November.
    12. Robert Basedow, 2021. "The EU's International Investment Policy ten years on: the Policy‐Making Implications of Unintended Competence Transfers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 643-660, May.
    13. Adam William Chalmers, 2014. "In over their heads: Public consultation, administrative capacity and legislative duration in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 595-613, December.
    14. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game‐Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 85-103, February.
    15. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Fraser, Clive D., 2012. "Does the public sector over-provide club goods? A general result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 397-400.
    16. Morcillo Laiz, Álvaro, 2018. "Unanimity, Consensus and Peripheral Parties as Determinants of EU Policy Coordination in Federal Member States," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 16(2), pages 198-223.
    17. Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, 2012. "Does implicit voting matter? Coalitional bargaining in the EU legislative process," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 513-534, December.
    18. Scott L. Greer & Elize Massard da Fonseca & Christopher Adolph, 2008. "Mobilizing Bias in Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(3), pages 403-433, September.
    19. James P. Cross, 2012. "Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 47-69, March.
    20. Běla Plechanovová, 2011. "The EU Council enlarged: North-South-East or core-periphery?," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:2:p:193-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.