IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ecdequ/v26y2012i3p267-276.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Governors as Economic Problem Solvers

Author

Listed:
  • Charles D. Taylor

Abstract

Despite the important role governors have played in shaping states’ economic development strategies, existing quantitative studies of state economic development policymaking have paid only scant attention to the factors that influence governors’ decisions about economic development policy. This study investigates these factors using a unique data set of gubernatorial economic development proposals generated by content analyzing hundreds of major legislative addresses delivered by governors during the 12-year period from 1995 to 2006. The findings reveal that gubernatorial economic development policymaking is only partially an attempt to solve a state’s economic problems. Economic policy making by governors appears to be driven largely by a desire to compete for new business investment during periods of economic expansion.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles D. Taylor, 2012. "Governors as Economic Problem Solvers," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 26(3), pages 267-276, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:26:y:2012:i:3:p:267-276
    DOI: 10.1177/0891242412453114
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0891242412453114
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0891242412453114?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Brace, 2002. "Mapping Economic Development Policy Change In The American States1," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 19(3), pages 161-178, September.
    2. Atkeson, Lonna Rae & Partin, Randall W., 1995. "Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 99-107, March.
    3. R. Scott Fosler, 1992. "State Economic Policy: The Emerging Paradigm," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 6(1), pages 3-13, February.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, 1998. "Industrial Incentives: Competition among American Cities and States," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ii, August.
    6. Paul Peretz, 1986. "The Market For Industry: Where Angels Fear To Tread?," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 5(3), pages 624-633, February.
    7. Jeremy L. Hall, 2007. "Developing Historical 50-State Indices of Innovation Capacity and Commercialization Capacity," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 21(2), pages 107-123, May.
    8. Walker, Jack L., 1977. "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 423-445, October.
    9. Ann Markusen (ed.), 2007. "Reining in the Competition for Capital," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ricc, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maryann Feldman & Lauren Lanahan, 2013. "State Science Policy Experiments," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Frontier: Rethinking Science and Innovation Policy, pages 287-317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lanahan, Lauren & Feldman, Maryann P., 2015. "Multilevel innovation policy mix: A closer look at state policies that augment the federal SBIR program," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1387-1402.
    3. Lauren Lanahan, 2016. "Multilevel public funding for small business innovation: a review of US state SBIR match programs," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 220-249, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alan Gerber & Mitchell Hoffman & John Morgan & Collin Raymond, 2020. "One in a Million: Field Experiments on Perceived Closeness of the Election and Voter Turnout," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 287-325, July.
    2. Carlianne Patrick, 2014. "Does Increasing Available Non-Tax Economic Development Incentives Result in More Jobs?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 67(2), pages 351-386, June.
    3. Mildred E. Warner & Lingwen Zheng, 2013. "Business Incentive Adoption in the Recession," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 27(2), pages 90-101, May.
    4. Linda Lobao & David Kraybill, 2009. "Poverty and Local Governments: Economic Development and Community Service Provision in an Era of Decentralization," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 418-451, September.
    5. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2013. "Running for office again: evidence from Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 677-702, September.
    6. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2019. "Var det fortsat ”the economy, stupid!” i 2016 og 2018? [Was it still "the economy, stupid!" in 2016 and 2018?]," MPRA Paper 97297, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Sunghoon Joo & Dong H. Kim & Jung Chul Park, 2020. "Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 247-276, May.
    8. Luigi M. Solivetti, 2020. "Political partisanship versus turnout in Italy’s 2016 referendum," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 709-734, June.
    9. Robert T. Greenbaum & Blair D. Russell & Tricia L. Petras, 2010. "Measuring the Distribution of Economic Development Tax Incentive Intensity," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(2), pages 154-168, May.
    10. Lingwen Zheng & Mildred Warner, 2010. "Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local Governments: A Story of Accountability and Policy Learning," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(4), pages 325-336, November.
    11. Adriana Giurgiu, 2012. "Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital – By K.P. Thomas," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 190-190, January.
    12. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    13. Enriqueta Aragonès & Clara Ponsatí, 2021. "Shocks to Issue Salience and Electoral Competition," Working Papers 1316, Barcelona School of Economics.
    14. Carlianne Patrick, 2014. "The economic development incentives game: an imperfect information, heterogeneous communities approach," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 53(1), pages 137-156, August.
    15. Christophe Crombez, 2004. "Introduction," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 227-231, July.
    16. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    17. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    19. Marco Faravelli & Randall Walsh, 2011. "Smooth Politicians And Paternalistic Voters: A Theory Of Large Elections," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000250, David K. Levine.
    20. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith & Neil J. Mitchell & Kerry G. Herron, 2004. "Foreign and Domestic Policy Belief Structures in the U.S. and British Publics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(3), pages 287-309, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:26:y:2012:i:3:p:267-276. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.