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Foundations of A Theory of Economic Warfare and Arms Control

Author

Listed:
  • Murray Wolfson

    (Professor, Department of Economics, Oregon State University.)

  • John P. Farrell

    (Professor, Department of Economics, California State University-Fullerton)

Abstract

War is carried out even in “peacetime†by exerting economic pressure in the form of forced deterring expenditure as well as by military threat. Peace can achieved only by considering both economic and military arms control. In this paper, disarmament and its verification by fiscal control are studied as a means of negotiating a reduction and elimination of both dimensions of war. This is first done under simplifying assumptions, but then is followed by an analysis of the complete theory of economic and military interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Murray Wolfson & John P. Farrell, 1989. "Foundations of A Theory of Economic Warfare and Arms Control," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 10(2), pages 47-75, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:10:y:1989:i:2:p:47-75
    DOI: 10.1177/073889428901000203
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1987. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," International Economic Association Series, in: Christian Schmidt (ed.), The Economics of Military Expenditures, chapter 9, pages 180-196, Palgrave Macmillan.
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