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The problem with accidental war

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  • Stephen L. Quackenbush

Abstract

Many theories of international conflict are based on the premise that war can occur by accident. The basic idea of accidental war is that crisis situations can spiral out of control, leading to the outbreak of a war despite no one having decided to go to war. Although World War I is often claimed to be the prime example of such an accidental war, modern research suggests that it began as a result of deliberate choices, not by accident. Nonetheless, accidental war continues to be used as an important building block in many theories, including theories of deterrence, bargaining, and the spiral model. In this article, I examine the validity of the assumption that wars can begin by accident, as well as the implications that the lack of accidental wars has for international relations theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen L. Quackenbush, 2023. "The problem with accidental war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(6), pages 675-691, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:40:y:2023:i:6:p:675-691
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942221149672
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Quackenbush, 2004. "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2), pages 87-107, April.
    2. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1987. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," International Economic Association Series, in: Christian Schmidt (ed.), The Economics of Military Expenditures, chapter 9, pages 180-196, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    4. Stephen L. Quackenbush, 2010. "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(1), pages 60-85, February.
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