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Une transition économique inattendue : vers le « cupidalisme » ?

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  • Andreff, Wladimir

Abstract

Depuis un quart de siècle des activités de captation d’actifs contrarient l’accumulation du capital dans l’économie réelle et financière légale et régulée. Ayant leur origine dans les économies postcommunistes en transition, elles se propagent à l’économie mondiale lors des transferts d’actifs du public vers le privé (privatisations), par la prédation financière d’actifs réels, dans la formation d’une économie financière parallèle (dont le shadow banking) et dans les trous noirs de la finance mondiale (paradis fiscaux et réglementaires). Elles s’appuient sur de mauvaises pratiques : sous-estimation et détournement des actifs, manipulation des cours ou des taux sur les marchés financiers, ventes à découvert, prêt systématique à clients insolvables, pyramides financières, fraudes et escroqueries, voire crime économique, en infraction aux règles formelles du capitalisme. Une cupidité systémique sous-tend ces stratégies de maximisation de la richesse relative, mais sans contrainte, dont la captation d’actifs est le moyen rationnel, dans une économie où « le gagnant rafle tout ». On regroupe par construction les activités de captation d’actifs dans un secteur « cupidaliste », côtoyant un secteur capitaliste. Faute de publications statistiques à son sujet, on propose une estimation préliminaire de ce secteur. Son émergence engendre de nouvelles formes de concurrence, une capture de l’État par l’oligarchie et un régime économique incohérent à croissance déséquilibrée, ralentie et instable, parcouru de crises résultant de la « lutte entre deux régulateurs », typique d’une économie en transition. Quelques mesures d’urgence de politique économique pour endiguer le développement du secteur cupidaliste sont esquissées en conclusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreff, Wladimir, 2013. "Une transition économique inattendue : vers le « cupidalisme » ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2013:10293
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    captation d’actifs; privatisation; marchés financiers; shadow banking; cupidité; winner-take-all; formes de concurrence; régime de croissance; transition; régulation; crise; asset grabbing; privatisation; financial markets; shadow banking; greed; winner-take-all; forms of competition; growth regime; transition; regulation; crisis; captación de activos; privatizacion; mercados financieros; shadow banking; cupidite; winner-take-all; formas de competencia; régimen de crecimiento; transición; regulación; crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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