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A Theoretical Bayesian Game Model for the Vendor-Retailer Relation

Author

Listed:
  • Emil CRI?AN

    () (Babe?-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Romania)

  • Ilie PARPUCEA

    () (Babe?-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Romania)

Abstract

We consider an equilibrated supply chain with two equal partners, a vendor and a retailer (also called newsboy type products supply chain). The actions of each partner are driven by profit. Given the fact that at supply chain level are specific external influences which affect the costs and concordant the profit, we use a game theoretic model for the situation, considering costs and demand. At theoretical level, symmetric and asymmetric information patterns are considered for this situation. There are at every supply chain’s level situations when external factors (such as inflation, raw-material rate) influence the situation of each partner even if the information is well shared within the chain. The model we propose considers both the external factors and asymmetric information within a supply chain.

Suggested Citation

  • Emil CRI?AN & Ilie PARPUCEA, 2012. "A Theoretical Bayesian Game Model for the Vendor-Retailer Relation," Economia. Seria Management, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 15(1), pages 99-107, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:rom:econmn:v:15:y:2012:i:1:p:99-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, May.
    2. Esmaeili, M. & Aryanezhad, Mir-Bahador & Zeephongsekul, P., 2009. "A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 195(2), pages 442-448, June.
    3. Nagarajan, Mahesh & Sosic, Greys, 2008. "Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 719-745, June.
    4. Xiao, Tiaojun & Qi, Xiangtong, 2008. "Price competition, cost and demand disruptions and coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 741-753, October.
    5. Corbett, Charles J. & DeCroix, Gregory A. & Ha, Albert Y., 2005. "Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(3), pages 653-667, June.
    6. Chu, Wai Hung Julius & Lee, Ching Chyi, 2006. "Strategic information sharing in a supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(3), pages 1567-1579, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; supply chain management; symmetric information; asymmetric information.;

    JEL classification:

    • M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Other

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