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The program of exemption from punishment in antitrust policy: empirical assessment of the problem

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  • Yusupova, Guzel'

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The influence of program of exemption from punishment (PEP) on the stability and the duration of the cartels enhances the effectiveness of the work as a competition authority, and antitrust policy in relation to agreements restricting competition in general. The results of the synthesis and critical analysis of empirical research on the factors of the PEP efficiency in Russia and abroad show the effect of changing the rules on the behavior of market participants. However, the methodology for assessing the effectiveness of PEP remains a debatable issue. The purpose of this work is to summarize the methods of empirical assessment to the effects of PEP.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusupova, Guzel', 2013. "The program of exemption from punishment in antitrust policy: empirical assessment of the problem," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 143-160, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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