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Contrats de dette participative en environnement stratégique


  • Guigou, Jean-Daniel



This article examines a Cournot game with financing of production capacities. The design of financial contracts sets up the relevant strategic variable of firms. The optimal contract is different from the standard debt contract by a clause of involvement: bank interest includes a fixed part and a variable part, indexed to firm profits. Debt-equity contract is procompetitive at game symmetrical equilibrium, in the sense that incites to competition. On the other hand, as soon as we introduce an avantage of first decision-maker at the contractual stage, it can be a source of entry strategical barriers. In fine, it has anticompetitive effects. Cet article considère un jeu en quantités avec financement des capacités de production, dans lequel la forme des contrats financiers constitue la variable stratégique pertinente des entreprises. Le contrat optimal se distingue du contrat de dette classique par la présence d’une clause de participation : l’intérêt versé à la banque comprend une partie fixe et une partie variable, indexée sur les profits de la firme. Le contrat de dette participative s’avère proconcurrentiel à l’équilibre symétrique du jeu, au sens où il incite à la concurrence. En revanche, dès lors qu’on introduit un avantage de premier décideur à l’étape contractuelle, il peut être une source de barrières stratégiques à l’entrée et donc avoir des effets anticoncurrentiels.

Suggested Citation

  • Guigou, Jean-Daniel, 2002. "Contrats de dette participative en environnement stratégique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 5-17, Mars.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:78:y:2002:i:1:p:5-17

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    1. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Bensaid, Bernard & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 1991. "Negotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1069-1085, July.
    4. McAndrews, James J & Nakamura, Leonard I, 1992. "Entry-Deterring Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 98-110, February.
    5. Bughin, J., 1999. "Oligopoly profit-sharing contracts and the firm's systematic risk1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 549-558, March.
    6. Dean Showalter, 1999. "Debt as an Entry Deterrent Under Bertrand Price Competition," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1069-1081, August.
    7. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2000. "Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: The limited liability effect revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1823-1840, December.
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