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Oligopoly profit-sharing contracts and the firm's systematic risk1

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  • Bughin, J.

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  • Bughin, J., 1999. "Oligopoly profit-sharing contracts and the firm's systematic risk1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 549-558, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:3:p:549-558
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
    2. Jacques Bughin, 1995. "Union-Firm Bargaining and the Influence of Product Market Power and Production Technology on Systematic Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(8), pages 1267-1278, August.
    3. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    4. Stephen G. Bronars & Donald R. Deere, 1991. "The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 231-254.
    5. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 937-953, December.
    6. Peyser, Paul S, 1994. "Beta, Market Power and Wage Rate Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 217-226, June.
    7. Bensaid, Bernard & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 1991. "Negotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1069-1085, July.
    8. Marti G. Subrahmanyam & Stavros B. Thomadakis, 1980. "Systematic Risk and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(3), pages 437-451.
    9. Ichino, Andrea, 1994. "Flexible labor compensation, risk sharing and company leverage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 1411-1421, August.
    10. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
    11. Sudarsanam, Puliyur S, 1992. "Market and Industry Structure and Corporate Cost of Capital," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 189-199, June.
    12. Fung, K. C., 1989. "Profit-sharing and European unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1787-1798, December.
    13. Fung, K. C., 1989. "Unemployment, profit-sharing and Japan's economic success," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 783-796, April.
    14. Sullivan, Timothy G, 1982. "The Cost of Capital and the Market Power of Firms: Reply and Correction," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(3), pages 523-525, August.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Asplund, Marcus, 2002. "Risk-averse firms in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 995-1012, September.

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