El origen del pánico de 2008: la crisis del mercado de crédito hipotecario en Estados Unidos
This article analyzes the causes of U.S. mortgage backed securities crisis, a crucial market in the financial panic of 2008. It shows that irrational behavior of investors is not infrequent, as evidenced by Ponzi schemes and bubbles. A comparison is made between traditional and new models of mortgage financing, where the key difference is the new model that unlinks incentives for different agents in the value chain and the risks they assume. It concludes with some reflections on the lessons that the experience of the Colombian mortgage crisis of 1998-2000 may offer for the resolution of the current crisis in the U.S.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 19 (July-December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kristopher S. Gerardi & Andreas Lehnert & Shane M. Sherlund & Paul S. Willen, 2009.
"Making sense of the subprime crisis,"
2009-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:10:y:2008:i:19:p:19-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.