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L’hétérogénéité du comportement de contrôle des investisseurs institutionnels français

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  • Noura Ben M’Barek

Abstract

[eng] Heterogeneity of French institutional investors corporate control behavior . Besides the increase of their equity ownership in French public companies, institutional investors are not systematically active shareholders. This research seeks to contribute to a better understanding of French institutional investors control behavior. It is based on qualitative and quantitative empirical studies. Data analysis shows that in general, French institutional investors are passive shareholders but their behavior is not homogeneous. Comparing to the two dominant theses in literature considering that institutional investors can be either active or passive shareholders, this study permits a more detailed classification of French institutional investors control behavior. According to this work, French institutional investors can have an influence behavior, a financial behavior as they can be dependant shareholders or active ones. . Classification JEL : G11, G32 [fre] Malgré l’augmentation de leurs détentions en capital, les investisseurs institutionnels n’exercent pas systématiquement un contrôle actif des entreprises en portefeuille. Cette recherche a pour objet de contribuer à mieux comprendre le comportement de contrôle des institutionnels français. L’étude se base sur deux méthodologies complémentaires, l’une qualitative et l’autre quantitative. L’analyse des données montre que les investisseurs institutionnels français, bien qu’ils soient globalement des actionnaires passifs, n’affichent pas pour autant un comportement de contrôle homogène. Par rapport aux deux thèses de l’activisme et de passivité des institutionnels avancées par la littérature, cette étude permet de dresser une typologie plus fine de l’attitude de contrôle des investisseurs institutionnels en identifiant quatre profils de comportement : un comportement d’influence, un comportement financier pur, un comportement de soutien des dirigeants pour éviter des conflits d’intérêts et un comportement actif. . Classification JEL : G11, G32

Suggested Citation

  • Noura Ben M’Barek, 2008. "L’hétérogénéité du comportement de contrôle des investisseurs institutionnels français," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 231-254.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2008_num_91_1_5067
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2008.5067
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2008.5067
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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