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Crédibilité et currency board : le cas lituanien

  • Jean-François Ponsot
  • Jérôme Blanc

[fre] Si le currency board établi en Lituanie en avril 1994 s'est accompagné de la stabilité monétaire, il n'a pas pour autant bénéficié de la crédibilité qu'il était censé apporter. Ce texte s'interroge sur ce défaut de crédibilité. On examine d'abord l'hypothèse courante selon laquelle l'écart entre le modèle pur de . currency board, censé apporter par lui-même la crédibilité, et le modèle lituanien, est à l'origine de ce déficit. On interroge ensuite les circonstances et les effets de la crise bancaire systémique de 1995-1996. On traite enfin des conséquences des chocs exogènes sur l'économie lituanienne. Le tout conduit à avancer une autre hypothèse : les contraintes du currency board - fut-il impur - ont provoqué le besoin de restauration de marge de manoeuvre discrétionnaires, ce qui a été traduit comme une dénaturation. Le défaut de crédibilité est alors le produit du currency board lui-même. . Classification JEL : E42, E52, E58, F31 [eng] Credibility and currency board : the Lithuanian model . The lithuanian currency board established in april, 1994 came along with the monetary stability, but it did not benefit from the credibility effect which it was supposed to bring. The text tries to explain this lack of credibility. A first part examines the current hypothesis according to which the differences between the pure model of currency board, supposed to bring credibility by itself, and the lithuanian model, is at the origin of this default. A second part examines the circumstances and effects of the systemic banking crisis of 1995-1996. A third part deals with the consequences of the exogeneous shocks on the Lithuanian economy. This leads to another hypothesis : the constraints of the currency board - may it be impure - induced the need to restore discretionary capacities, what was translated as a denaturation. The lack of credibility is then the product of the currency board itself. . JEL classification : E42, E52, E58, F31

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

Volume (Year): 75 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 113-127

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2004_num_75_2_4896
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2004.4896
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecofi

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  1. Kornélia Krajnyák & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 1998. "Competitiveness in Transition Economies: What Scope for Real Appreciation?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 309-362, June.
  2. Nenovsky Nikolay & Hristov Kalin & Mihaylov Mihail, 2001. "Comparing Currency Board Automatic Mechanism in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-44, December.
  3. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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