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Qui ont été les privilégiés de Cooke ? : Perdants et gagnants de la réglementation des fonds propres

Author

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  • Joseph Bisignano

Abstract

[fre] Après la mise en application de Bâle I en 1990, plusieurs pays ont enregistré une réduction des prêts bancaires et une faible croissance générale de l'économie. Plusieurs observateurs ont attribué ce déclin à la mise en application de l'Accord. Cet article propose un retour en arrière sur ce débat, dans le but de déterminer les « gagnants » et les « perdants » de cet Accord.. Deux questions fondamentales doivent être gardées à l'esprit. Tout d'abord, les restrictions sur l'endettement des banques via la réglementation des fonds propres entraînent-elles les banques à augmenter ou à réduire la prise de risque dans les portefeuilles ? D'autre part, quelle est l'interaction entre la réglementation des fonds propres pondérés en fonction des risques et la garantie des dépôts (et plus généralement le « filet de sécurité »). La réponse à ces deux questions permet d'évaluer l'efficacité de l'Accord de 1988 et ses conséquences en termes de répartition. . Classification JEL : E44, G21, G28 [eng] Winners and losers resulting From the implementation of Basel I . Not long after the implementation of Basel I in 1990, several countries experienced sharp declines in bank lending and weak aggregate economic growth. Several commentators attributed the decline in bank lending to the implementation of the original Accord. Academics even suggested that under certain conditions, the Accord might increase the risk in bank portfolios. This article is a look-back at that debate with the objective of determining who might have been the « winners » and « losers » resulting from the Accord. . There are two fundamental questions to keep in mind in reading this review. Firstly, do restrictions on bank leverage via capital regulation lead banks to increase or decrease portfolio risk-taking ? Secondly, what is the interaction between risk-weighted capital regulation and deposit insurance, and the safety net more generally ? The answer to both questions helps determine an assessment of the efficacy of the 1988 Accord and its allocative consequences. . JEL classification : E44, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Bisignano, 2003. "Qui ont été les privilégiés de Cooke ? : Perdants et gagnants de la réglementation des fonds propres," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 73(4), pages 77-96.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_73_4_5001
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2003.5001
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.5001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keeley, Michael C. & Furlong, Frederick T., 1990. "A reexamination of mean-variance analysis of bank capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 69-84, March.
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    5. Stolz, Stéphanie, 2002. "The Relationship between Bank Capital, Risk-Taking, and Capital Regulation: A Review of the Literature," Kiel Working Papers 1105, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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    Cited by:

    1. Samira Hellou, 2018. "Term structure of bank flows to emerging countries: what effects of short- vs. long-term regulatory arbitrage are?," Working Papers hal-04141704, HAL.
    2. Michel Boutillier & Samira Hellou, 2017. "The impact of regulatory requirements on the banking flows to emerging countries," Post-Print hal-01549858, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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