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L'insuffisance de l'explication légale pour rendre compte des difficultés de la transition russe en matière de « corporate governance »

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  • Mathilde Mesnard

Abstract

[eng] Why the Legal Argument Falls Short of Explaining the Corporate Governance Problems in the Russian Transition . It is easy to get a well-detailed and documented picture of the different ways in which corporate governance, in Russia, has failed. There are, however, very few analysis that go explicitly into what mechanisms brought about this failure. One of the first major thesis has been the legal explanation. The aim of this article is to refute the legal argument or at least to show how it falls short of explaining this failure. We first outline the legal argument as it was recently developed in different texts, highlighting its theoretical stakes. We analyse the main legal problems in the Russian transition, as well as the origins of these problems. To achieve this, legal evolutions are discussed, and the main obstacles to a satisfactory legal development are shown. The point is to show how the problems in Russian legal development are for the most part endogenous to the transition process. . JEL classifications : G30, K20, P20 [fre] Il est facile de rendre compte des manifestations de l’échec de la corporate governance russe. En revanche, peu d’études permettent d’analyser les mécanismes ayant conduit à cet échec. Une première interprétation a été le recours à l’explication légale. Notre article s’attache à montrer l’insuffisance de cet argument. Nous exposons, tout d’abord, cet argument tel qu’il s’est développé récemment dans la littérature, en mettant en évidence ses enjeux théoriques. Puis nous analysons les principales difficultés légales de la transition russe, ainsi que les origines de ces difficultés. Pour ce faire, nous faisons le point sur les évolutions récentes du cadre juridique, puis nous exposons les principaux obstacles à un développement légal satisfaisant. Nous mettons enfin en évidence les particularités de la Russie en matière juridique ainsi que les déterminants de ses difficultés légales. . Classification JEL : G30, K20, P20

Suggested Citation

  • Mathilde Mesnard, 2001. "L'insuffisance de l'explication légale pour rendre compte des difficultés de la transition russe en matière de « corporate governance »," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 6(1), pages 519-542.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2001_hos_6_1_3925
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2001.3925
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2001.3925
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General

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