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Constitution européenne : redistribution du pouvoir des États au Conseil de lUE

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  • Frédéric Bobay

Abstract

[eng] " European Constitution : a new distribution of Member States '' powers in the EU Council " Par Frédéric Bobay . Using a game theory approach , this article analyses the impact of the European Constitution on the relative power of Member States in the European Union Council (with and without the Turkey membership hypothesis ). Compared to previous voting systems , the main effect of the Constitution is to sharply increase the influence of the biggest Member State (Germany or Turkey ), as well as that of the smallest Members (Malta , Luxembourg , Cyprus , Estonia , Latvia , Slovenia …). This is a result of a power redistribution from the medium size Member States (Hungary , Belgium , Portugal , Czech Republic , Greece , Netherlands …). Spain and Poland account for a significant lost of influence , considering the high level obtained in the Nice Treaty voting system . Concerning France , there is no impact of the Constitution when compared to Nice on the short term , but the impact becomes significantly negative on the long term under the hypothesis of EU enlargement to Turkey . [fre] À partir d ’ une méthode de la théorie de jeux , cet article analyse l ’ impact des dispositions de la Constitution européenne sur les capacités d ’ influence des États membres au Conseil de l ’ Union européenne (avec et sans hypothèse d ’ adhésion de la Turquie ). Par rapport aux système de vote précédents , le principal effet de la Constitution est d ’ accroître significativement l ’ influence de l ’ État membre le plus grand (Allemagne ou Turquie ), ainsi que des plus petits (Malte , Luxembourg , Chypre , Estonie , Lettonie , Slovénie …). Cette redistribution du pouvoir trouve sa contrepartie dans les États de taille moyenne (Hongrie , Belgique , Portugal , République tchèque , Grèce , Pays-Bas …). L ’ Espagne et la Pologne enregistrent une perte d ’ influence notable , compte tenu du niveau élevé obtenu par ces pays dans le système de Nice . Concernant la France , l ’ effet de la Constitution par rapport à Nice est neutre à court terme . Dans le cas d ’ une adhésion de la Turquie , cet effet devient significativement négatif à long terme .

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Bobay, 2004. "Constitution européenne : redistribution du pouvoir des États au Conseil de lUE," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 163(2), pages 101-115.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_163_2_7346
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2004.7346
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2004.7346
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zineb Abidi & Matthieu Leprince & Vincent Merlin, 2020. "Power Inequality in Inter-communal Structures: The Simulated Impact of a Reform in the Case of the Municipalities in Western France," Post-Print halshs-02996998, HAL.
    2. Eloi Laurent & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2007. "What (Economic) Constitution does the EU need?," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-04, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    3. Eloi Laurent & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2006. "Integrity and Efficiency in the EU: The Case against the European economic constitution," Working Papers hal-00972707, HAL.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3681 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2281 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Eloi Laurent & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2006. "Country size and strategic aspects of structural reforms in the EU," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/3681, Sciences Po.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3531 is not listed on IDEAS

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