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The legacy of Augustin Cournot

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  • James W. Friedman

Abstract

[fre] Entendu dans un sens un large, l'héritage de Cournot pour les économistes consiste (i) en ce qu'il a montré comment utiliser de manire générale les mathématiques pour développer des théories économiques, au lieu d'avoir recours des exemples reposant sur des formes fonctionnelles spécifiques, (ii) en ce qu'il a donné un traitement clairet sophistiqué de la demande de marché, du monopole, des marchés concurrentiels et, avant tout, de l'oligopole. Les économistes contemporains se souviennent seulement de Cournot pour sa théorie de l'oligopole. Cependant, il semble avoir eu une grande influence sur Marshall et Walras, ainsi que sur d'autres économistes moins enclins aux mathématiques. [eng] Broadly speaking, Cournot's legacy to economics consists of (i) showing economists how to use mathematics in a general way to develop economic theory, as opposed to using examples based on specific functional forms, (ii) his clear and sophisticated treatment of market demand, monopoly, competitive markets, and above all, oligopoly. Among contemporary economists Cournot is mainly remembered only for his oligopoly theory ; however, he appears to have had a formative influence on Marshall and Walras as well as a lesser influence on later mathematically inclined economists.

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  • James W. Friedman, 2000. "The legacy of Augustin Cournot," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 31-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1287
    DOI: 10.3406/cep.2000.1287
    Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.2000.1287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Álvarez, 2010. "Early Neoclassical views on Monopoly: the Cournotian heritage," Revista Ecos de Economía, Universidad EAFIT, January.
    2. Clarence Morrison, 2003. "Augustin cournot and neoclassical economics," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(2), pages 123-132, June.
    3. Nora Grisáková & Peter Štetka, 2022. "Cournot’s Oligopoly Equilibrium under Different Expectations and Differentiated Production," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-17, December.

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