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Analýza vlivu míry konkurence na cenu rozsáhlých staveb dopravní infrastruktury
[The Analysis of the Relationship Between the Rate of Competition and the Prices of Large Transport Infrastructure Buildings]

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  • Jan Pavel

Abstract

The paper is dealing with the problem of relationship between the rate of competition and final prices in the public procurement. This issue is analysed on the sector of infrastructure buildings in the Czech Republic. The main goal of the paper is to verify the relevance of the hypothesis, that there is a negative relationship between the number of bidders and the final prices. The paper is divided into five main parts. The main theoretical fundaments of the analyses are described in the first part, where the results of relevant sources are summarized as well. Next part highlights the system of financing the transport infrastructure in the Czech Republic and describes the main steps in the process of public procurement. Based on the theoretical analysis three hypotheses are formulated in the third part, which relevance is tested using the econometrics instruments. The results of the quantitative analyses are summarised in the fourth chapter. The last part, conclusion, summarises the main results and formulates the policy recommendations, which could increase the effectiveness of the public expenditure on the transport infrastructure.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Pavel, 2010. "Analýza vlivu míry konkurence na cenu rozsáhlých staveb dopravní infrastruktury [The Analysis of the Relationship Between the Rate of Competition and the Prices of Large Transport Infrastructure Bu," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(3), pages 343-356.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2010:y:2010:i:3:id:734:p:343-356
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.734
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
    2. AndréS GóMez-Lobo & Stefan Szymanski, 2001. "A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 105-113, February.
    3. Otis W. Gilley & Gordon V. Karels, 1981. "The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 637-648, Autumn.
    4. Baron, David P, 1972. "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 384-394, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Pavel, 2013. "Comparison of efficiency of public procurement organized by public sector and local monopolies," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 61(7), pages 2611-2615.
    2. Juraj Nemec & Matus Grega & Marta Orviska, 2020. "Over-bureaucratisation in public procurement: purposes and results," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 251-263.
    3. Arnošt Veselý & František Ochrana & Stanislav Klazar, 2015. "An Analysis of Expenses for the Outsourcing of Policy Advice on the Level of the Ministries of the Czech Republic," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(5), pages 581-601.
    4. Peter Džupka & Matúš Kubák & Peter Nemec, 2020. "Sustainable Public Procurement in Central European Countries. Can It Also Bring Savings?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(21), pages 1-13, November.
    5. Grega Matus & Orviska Marta & Nemec Juraj & Lawson Colin, 2019. "Factors Determining the Efficiency of Slovak Public Procurement," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 43-68, June.
    6. Zuzana Špinerová, 2014. "Public Procurement and its Impact on Financial Indicators of Companies in the Construction Sector in Slovakia [Verejné obstarávanie a jeho vplyv na finančné ukazovatele firiem v sektore stavebníctv," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(3), pages 61-76.
    7. Jan Pavel & Emilia Sičáková-Beblavá, 2013. "Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(1), pages 111-124.
    8. Luboš Dufek, 2013. "Measuring private transaction costs of public procurement: Case of the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 317-325.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition; effectiveness; Czech Republic; Public Procurement; Infrastructure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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