Analýza vlivu míry konkurence na cenu rozsáhlých staveb dopravní infrastruktury
[The Analysis of the Relationship Between the Rate of Competition and the Prices of Large Transport Infrastructure Buildings]
The paper is dealing with the problem of relationship between the rate of competition and final prices in the public procurement. This issue is analysed on the sector of infrastructure buildings in the Czech Republic. The main goal of the paper is to verify the relevance of the hypothesis, that there is a negative relationship between the number of bidders and the final prices. The paper is divided into five main parts. The main theoretical fundaments of the analyses are described in the first part, where the results of relevant sources are summarized as well. Next part highlights the system of financing the transport infrastructure in the Czech Republic and describes the main steps in the process of public procurement. Based on the theoretical analysis three hypotheses are formulated in the third part, which relevance is tested using the econometrics instruments. The results of the quantitative analyses are summarised in the fourth chapter. The last part, conclusion, summarises the main results and formulates the policy recommendations, which could increase the effectiveness of the public expenditure on the transport infrastructure.
Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: nam. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Web: http://www.vse.cz/polek/ Email:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
- AndréS GóMez-Lobo & Stefan Szymanski, 2001. "A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(1), pages 105-113, February.
- Baron, David P, 1972. "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 384-394, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2010:y:2010:i:3:id:734:p:343-356. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.