Vysokoškolské vzdělání jako informace
This article deals with the issues of different theoretical approaches to education. Education is seen as a tool, how to distinct different marginal productivities of employees. We start from the fact of an information asymmetry on the labour markets, asymmetry between employers and potential employees. Based on this we try to apply the concept to the Czech environment and specifically to the difference between master and bachelor/specialist degrees. We come out from the statistical facts that the master graduates reach much higher wage rates than bachelor graduates. The article finds the signs of two competing explanations of that fact, the human capital theory and the signaling theory.
Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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