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Can money buy control of Congress?

Author

Listed:
  • William Minozzi
  • Gabriel J Madson
  • David A Siegel

Abstract

Can a political party spend enough across electoral campaigns to garner a majority within the U.S. Congress? Prior research on campaign spending minimizes the importance of campaign heterogeneity and fails to aggregate effects across campaigns, rendering it unable to address this question. Instead, we tackle the question with a system-level analysis of campaign expenditures. First, using a flexible machine learning approach, we show that spending has substantial and nonlinear marginal effects on outcomes at the level of the campaign. Second, by aggregating these effects to the entire U.S. Congress, we show that large seat swings that change congressional control have, in the past, been possible for expenditure levels consonant with those presently observed after having removed the most extreme levels. However, this possibility appears to have faded over the past decade. Our approach also allows us to illustrate the often significant effects that eliminating campaign spending could have.

Suggested Citation

  • William Minozzi & Gabriel J Madson & David A Siegel, 2024. "Can money buy control of Congress?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(6), pages 1-12, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0305846
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0305846
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
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    4. McGHEE, ERIC, 2008. "National Tides and Local Results in US House Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 719-738, October.
    5. Gerber, Alan, 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 401-411, June.
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