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Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China

Author

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  • Dongmei Feng
  • Liang Wang
  • Xiumei Duan

Abstract

There is a huge funding gap in the abandoned mines ecological restoration in China. It is of great research value to explore how PPP model can better introduce social capital into the low-profit ecological restoration of abandoned mines. Based on the innovation perspective of the central government’s reward and punishment system, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of "local government-social capital", analyzes the interaction and behavior mechanism of core stakeholders in the operation process of abandoned mines ecological restoration PPP mode, and discusses the influence of evolutionary equilibrium strategy and parameters change on evolutionary strategy under different scenarios by Matlab simulation. The research shows that the abandoned mines ecological restoration needs the support of the central government. When the local government lightly punishes the low-quality service of social capital, the central government needs to pay higher costs to promote all parties to actively participate in the operation and supervision of the PPP project. The revenue and cost of government supervision, the operating subsidy for social capital and the cost saved by social capital in providing bad service are the key factors affecting the evolution of the game between government and social capital. Punishment can effectively spur social capital to keep the contract and operate in the project, but the punishment effect will be ineffective without government supervision. Finally, some suggestions are put forward, such as establishing a long-term supervision mechanism and a reasonable income mechanism for PPP projects, increasing penalties for violations, attracting third parties to reduce supervision costs and strengthening communication between the two parties, so as to make the project take into account the economic performance of social capital and the social welfare of government departments, and achieve dual Pareto improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Dongmei Feng & Liang Wang & Xiumei Duan, 2024. "Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government’s reward and punishment system in China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(5), pages 1-21, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0304368
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0304368
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Zhang, Suyong & Wang, Chuanxu & Yu, Chao, 2019. "The evolutionary game analysis and simulation with system dynamics of manufacturer's emissions abatement behavior under cap-and-trade regulation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 355(C), pages 343-355.
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    Cited by:

    1. Allah Abadi, Amir Fazli & Ataee-pour, Majid, 2025. "Evaluating public-private partnerships in mining: An evolutionary game theory approach to strategic dynamics and regulatory impacts," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).

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