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Power motivation arousal promotes prosocial behavior in the dictator game depending on social presence

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  • Jianfeng Wang
  • Shuangyi Qu
  • Ruiyu Li
  • Yunqiao Fu

Abstract

Despite the popular notion that power motivations are associated with aggression and antisocial behavior, this study tested the hypothesis that activating power motivations can promote prosocial behavior. Because previous research has shown that public prosocial behavior is associate with reputation and status, this study examined how making prosocial decisions publicly or privately moderates the relationship between power motivations and prosocial behavior. One hundred and forty participants were randomly assigned to watch 20 min of either The Experiment (power motivation arousal) or a documentary called Beautiful China (control condition). A modified version of the dictator game was used to measure prosocial behavior. Participants were instructed to allocate an amount of money between themselves and a stranger girl in need, in the presence of the experimenter (the experimenter registers donation amount) or in the absence of the experimenter (the donation was put in a closed envelope). The results showed that individuals in the power motivation arousal group increased their help when their reputation was under scrutiny due to the experimenter’s presence. In the private condition (experimenter is absent), power motivation is not related to prosocial behavior. The contrasting behavioral reactions resulting from the presence or absence of the experimenter are discussed in terms of reputation gain and competitive altruism.

Suggested Citation

  • Jianfeng Wang & Shuangyi Qu & Ruiyu Li & Yunqiao Fu, 2022. "Power motivation arousal promotes prosocial behavior in the dictator game depending on social presence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(11), pages 1-12, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0277294
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0277294
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