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Differences in Anticipated Interaction Drive Own Group Biases in Face Memory

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  • John Paul Wilson
  • Pirita E See
  • Michael J Bernstein
  • Kurt Hugenberg
  • Christopher Chartier

Abstract

According to much research, the Own Group Bias (OGB) in face memory occurs as a consequence of social categorization – ingroup members are more likely than outgroup members to be encoded as individuals and remembered well. The current work is an examination of the role of anticipated future interaction in the OGB. We conducted two studies showing that anticipated interaction influences group-based face memory. In Study 1, we provided correlational evidence that beliefs about the amount and importance of future interaction one will have with racial outgroup members is associated with the OGB, such that people expecting more interaction with outgroup members show a reduced OGB. In Study 2, we manipulated expectations about future interactions with lab-created groups and observed that high levels of anticipated future interaction with the outgroup eliminated the OGB. Thus, social group categorization drives face memory biases to the extent that group membership affords the expectation of interpersonal interaction.

Suggested Citation

  • John Paul Wilson & Pirita E See & Michael J Bernstein & Kurt Hugenberg & Christopher Chartier, 2014. "Differences in Anticipated Interaction Drive Own Group Biases in Face Memory," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(3), pages 1-6, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0090668
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0090668
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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Andy H Ng & Jennifer R Steele & Joni Y Sasaki & Meghan George, 2020. "How robust is the own-group face recognition bias? Evidence from first- and second-generation East Asian Canadians," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-20, May.

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