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The ability of excise duty to reduce market failures in Poland

Author

Listed:
  • Kacper Ochocki

    (Wroclaw University of Economics and Business, Poland)

Abstract

Motivation: The modern economy shows many imperfections in its functioning that do not exist in the model conditions of perfect competition. These are the so-called market failures which prompted the state’s activity in the markets. The subject of considerations in this paper is the ability of the excise duty to eliminate some of these imperfections. Aim: The main aim of the study is an attempt to answer the question whether on the beer market in Poland the declared objectives of the regulation are consistent with the achieved results on that market. Materials and methods: To achieve the assumed goal, the analysis of the literature on the subject, legal acts and statistical data was used, and the problem was illustrated on the basis of a case study based on own research. Results: The analyzes presented in this article on the regulation of the beer market in Poland may be helpful in supporting the hypothesis of inconsistent regulation of this market. In other words, the applied regulatory tool, which is the excise duty, does not lead to a decrease in the consumption of these goods, but causes other negative side effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Kacper Ochocki, 2020. "The ability of excise duty to reduce market failures in Poland," Catallaxy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 5(2), pages 75-86, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pes:iercxy:v:5:y:2020:i:2:p:75-86
    DOI: 10.24136/cxy.2020.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gallet, Craig A., 2007. "The demand for alcohol: a meta-analysis of elasticities," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 51(2), pages 1-15.
    2. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, December.
    3. Tyler Cowen & Eric Crampton (ed.), 2002. "Market Failure or Success," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2759.
    4. Surdej, Aleksander, 2014. "Regulacyjne instrumenty w polityce publicznej," Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Public Policy Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 1(4), pages 1-17, December.
    5. James Fogarty, 2004. "The Own-Price Elasticity of Alcohol: A Meta-Analysis," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 04-01, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; excise tax; market failures; beer market; tax efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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