IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v23y2010i5p1981-2023.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Repeated Signaling and Firm Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher A. Hennessy
  • Dmitry Livdan
  • Bruno Miranda

Abstract

As an alternative to the pecking order, we develop a dynamic calibratable model where the firm avoids mispricing via signaling. The model is rich, featuring endogenous investment, debt, default, dividends, equity flotations, and share repurchases. In equilibrium, firms with negative private information have negative leverage, issue equity, and overinvest. Firms signal positive information by substituting debt for equity. Default costs induce such firms to underinvest. Model simulations reveal that repeated signaling can account for countercyclical leverage, leverage persistence, volatile procylical investment, and correlation between size and leverage. The model generates other novel predictions. Investment rates are the key predictor of abnormal announcement returns in simulated data, with leverage only predicting returns unconditionally. Firms facing asymmetric information actually exhibit higher mean Q ratios and investment rates. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher A. Hennessy & Dmitry Livdan & Bruno Miranda, 2010. "Repeated Signaling and Firm Dynamics," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 1981-2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:5:p:1981-2023
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhq004
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Sang-Joon & Bae, John & Oh, Hannah, 2019. "Financing strategically: The moderation effect of marketing activities on the bifurcated relationship between debt level and firm valuation of small and medium enterprises," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 663-681.
    2. Devos, Erik & Rahman, Shofiqur & Tsang, Desmond, 2017. "Debt covenants and the speed of capital structure adjustment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Egemen Eren & Semyon Malamud & Haonan Zhou, 2023. "Signaling with debt currency choice," BIS Working Papers 1067, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Clausen, Saskia & Flor, Christian Riis, 2015. "The impact of assets-in-place on corporate financing and investment decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 64-80.
    5. Aktas, Nihat & Xu, Guosong & Yurtoglu, Burcin, 2018. "She is mine: Determinants and value effects of early announcements in takeovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 180-202.
    6. Fulghieri, Paolo & Hackbarth, Dirk & Garcia, Diego, 2015. "Asymmetric information, security design, and the pecking (dis)order," CEPR Discussion Papers 10660, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Miglo, Anton & Wu, Congsheng, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and IPO Size," MPRA Paper 56550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Li, Qi, 2022. "Security design without verifiable retention," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    9. Shibata, Takashi & Nishihara, Michi, 2023. "Optimal financing and investment strategies under asymmetric information on liquidation value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    10. Ilona Babenko & Yuri Tserlukevich & Pengcheng Wan, 2020. "Is Market Timing Good for Shareholders?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3542-3560, August.
    11. Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Whited, Toni M., 2012. "Dynamic Models and Structural Estimation in Corporate Finance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 6(1–2), pages 1-163, November.
    12. Chao, Ching-Hsiang & Huang, Chih-Jen, 2022. "Firm performance following actual share repurchases: Effects of investment crowding out and financial flexibility," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Bai-Sian Chen & Hong-Yi Chen & Hsiao-Yin Chen & Fang-Chi Lin, 2022. "Corporate growth and strategic payout policy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 641-669, August.
    14. Miglo, Anton, 2010. "The Pecking Order, Trade-off, Signaling, and Market-Timing Theories of Capital Structure: a Review," MPRA Paper 46691, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2013.
    15. Agliardi, Elettra & Agliardi, Rossella & Spanjers, Willem, 2016. "Corporate financing decisions under ambiguity: Pecking order and liquidity policy implications," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 6012-6020.
    16. Barigozzi, Francesca & Tedeschi, Piero, 2019. "On the credibility of ethical banking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 381-402.
    17. Luca Benzoni & Lorenzo Garlappi & Robert Goldstein, 2023. "Incomplete Information, Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4331-4352, July.
    18. Morellec, Erwan & Schürhoff, Norman, 2011. "Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 262-288, February.
    19. E. Agliardi & R. Agliardi & W. Spanjers, 2014. "Cash holdings and financing decisions under ambiguity," Working Papers wp979, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    20. Ordoñez, Guillermo & Perez-Reyna, David & Yogo, Motohiro, 2019. "Leverage dynamics and credit quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 183-212.
    21. Miglo, Anton, 2012. "Multi-stage investment, long-term asymmetric information and equity issues," MPRA Paper 46692, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Abdelhafid Benamraoui & Yousef Alwardat, 2019. "Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(1), pages 96-108, January.
    23. F. Barigozzi & P. Tedeschi, 2016. "Informed Principals in the Credit Market when Borrowers and Lenders Are Heterogeneous," Working Papers wp1051, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:5:p:1981-2023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.