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Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial Innovation

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  • Dow, James

Abstract

I consider the costs and benefits of introducing a new security in a standard framework where uninformed traders with hedging needs interact with risk-averse informed traders. Opening a new market may make everybody worse off, even when the new security is traded in equilibrium. This article emphasizes cross-market links between hedging and speculative demands: risk-averse arbitrageurs can use the new market to hedge their positions in the preexisting security, which can affect liquidity in the old market. More generally, the availability of such hedging opportunities will influence the strategies to which traders will direct resources. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Dow, James, 1998. "Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial Innovation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(4), pages 739-755.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:11:y:1998:i:4:p:739-55
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    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5521 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Zhang, Yue, 2015. "The securitization of gold and its potential impact on gold stocks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 309-326.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11540 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Viral V. Acharya & Alberto Bisin, 2005. "Optimal Financial-Market Integration and Security Design," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(6), pages 2397-2434, November.
    5. DESGRANGES, Gabriel & FOUCAULT, Thierry, 2000. "Reputation-based pricing and price improvements in dealership markets," HEC Research Papers Series 716, HEC Paris, revised 01 Mar 2002.
    6. Dannhauser, Caitlin D., 2017. "The impact of innovation: Evidence from corporate bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs)," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 537-560.
    7. Bond, Philip & Dow, James, 2021. "Failing to forecast rare events," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 1001-1016.
    8. Shiyang Huang & Maureen O’Hara & Zhuo Zhong, 2021. "Innovation and Informed Trading: Evidence from Industry ETFs [Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(3), pages 1280-1316.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6311 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Norvald Instefjord & Kouji Sasaki, 2008. "Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 455-480, October.
    11. Desgranges, Gabriel & Foucault, Thierry, 2005. "Reputation-based pricing and price improvements," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 493-527.
    12. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2016. "Government as Borrower of First Resort," CEPR Discussion Papers 11362, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Gilles Chemla & Christopher A. Hennessy, 2014. "Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-01457063, HAL.
    14. Jinghan Cai & Chiu Yu Ko & Yuming Li & Le Xia, 2019. "Hide and Seek: Uninformed Traders and the Short-sales Constraints," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 20(1), pages 319-356, May.
    15. Basak, Suleyman & Croitoru, Benjamin, 2007. "International good market segmentation and financial innovation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 267-293, April.
    16. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Privately versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 8403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Security Design: Signaling versus Speculative Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 8336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Boni, Leslie & Leach, Chris, 2004. "Expandable limit order markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 145-185, February.
    19. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher A., 2016. "Government as borrower of first resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1-16.

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