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Reciprocity in Organizations: Evidence from the UK

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  • Florian Englmaier
  • Thomas Kolaska
  • Stephen Leider

Abstract

Recent laboratory evidence suggests that personality traits, in particular social preferences, may affect contractual outcomes under moral hazard. Using the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 we find that behaviour of employers and employees is consistent with the presence of gift-exchange motives: firms that screen applicants for personality are less likely to pay low wages and more likely to provide (non-pecuniary) benefits. Firms likewise benefit from employee screening, as they can implement more team-working and are generally more successful. Other human resource management practices only poorly predict these patterns. Moreover, there is no association between dismissals and personality tests, indicating that personality tests do not merely improve the fit between applicant and employer. Hence, we conclude that motivation based on gift-exchange motives is a plausible explanation for our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Englmaier & Thomas Kolaska & Stephen Leider, 2016. "Reciprocity in Organizations: Evidence from the UK," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(3), pages 522-546.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:62:y:2016:i:3:p:522-546.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2020. "Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-280, March.
    2. Non, Arjan, 2018. "Training participation and the role of reciprocal attitudes," ROA Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
    3. Sauermann, Jan, 2015. "Worker Reciprocity and the Returns to Training: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 9179, IZA Network @ LISER.
    4. Yang Yang & Simon Gao & Henry Zhen Huang, 2025. "Sustainability Agency Theory: A New Agency Framework for Social Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(11), pages 1-19, May.
    5. Ester Manna, 2017. "Customer‐oriented employees: Blessing or curse for firms?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 842-875, December.
    6. Constança Esteves-Sorenson, 2018. "Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Addressing the Conflicting Evidence with a Careful Test," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4365-4388, September.

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