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In the Quest of Systemic Externalities: A Review of the Literature

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  • Wolf Wagner

Abstract

We review the banking literature with the view of identifying systemic externalities arising from bank failures. We are particularly interested in how such externalities may depend on the characteristics of the financial system at the time of failure, and on the characteristics of the failing bank itself. We conclude that the majority of the mechanisms in the literature suggest that externalities are higher at times when other banks are failing as well or are close to failure. We discuss the implications for optimal capital requirements. (JEL codes: G01, G21, G28) Copyright The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolf Wagner, 2010. "In the Quest of Systemic Externalities: A Review of the Literature ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 56(1), pages 96-111, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:56:y:2010:i:1:p:96-111
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifp022
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzo Esposito & Giuseppe Mastromatteo, "undated". "In the Long Run We Are All Herd: On the Nature and Outcomes of the Beauty Contest," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_972, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Jürgen Antony & Michiel Bijlsma & Adam Elbourne & Marcel Lever & Gijsbert Zwart, 2012. "Financial transaction tax: review and assessment," CPB Discussion Paper 202, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Hilmer, Michael, 2014. "Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100552, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Mr. Michael Keen, 2011. "The Taxation and Regulation of Banks," IMF Working Papers 2011/206, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Lukas Scheffknecht, 2013. "Contextualizing Systemic Risk," ROME Working Papers 201317, ROME Network.
    6. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2012. "Supervising Cross-Border Banks : Theory, Evidence and Policy (Revised version of CentER Discussion Paper 2011-127)," Discussion Paper 2012-059, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Claudio Borio, 2011. "Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 87-117, December.
    8. Calmès, Christian & Théoret, Raymond, 2013. "Market-oriented banking, financial stability and macro-prudential indicators of leverage," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 13-34.
    9. Co-Pierre Georg & Jenny Poschmann, 2010. "Systemic risk in a network model of interbank markets with central bank activity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-033, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2011. "Bank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Replaced by CentER DP 2012-059)," Discussion Paper 2011-127, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2012. "Supervising Cross-Border Banks : Theory, Evidence and Policy (Revised version of EBC Discussion Paper 2011-033)," Other publications TiSEM dfd16cc4-fe7a-4c89-997f-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Giuseppe Mastromatteo & Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2016. "Minsky at Basel: A Global Cap to Build an Effective Postcrisis Banking Supervision Framework," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_875, Levy Economics Institute.
    13. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2011. "Bank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Replaced by EBC DP 2012-015)," Other publications TiSEM 2c7d7637-bd3a-4a43-beac-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Lars Jonung, 2013. "Macroprudential supervision and regulation – lessons for the next crisis," Chapters, in: Mats Benner (ed.), Before and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis, chapter 11, pages 218-233, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Too Many to Fail - How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-18, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    16. Bucci, Alberto & La Torre, Davide & Liuzzi, Danilo & Marsiglio, Simone, 2019. "Financial contagion and economic development: An epidemiological approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 211-228.
    17. Jürgen Antony & Michiel Bijlsma & Adam Elbourne & Marcel Lever & Gijsbert Zwart, 2012. "Financial transaction tax: review and assessment," CPB Discussion Paper 202.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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