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Evaluating Policy Approaches Towards Tackling Undeclared Work in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Colin C. Williams

    (The University of Sheffield, Management School)

  • Gamze Oz Yalaman

    (Eskisehir Osmangazi University, Meselik-Eskisehir, Turkey)

  • Abbi M. Kedir

    (The University of Sheffield, Management School)

Abstract

This paper evaluates two competing theories for explaining and tackling undeclared work. The dominant rational economic actor approach views undeclared work as arising when the perceived benefits of engaging in undeclared work outweigh the costs, so attention is put on increasing the costs, whilst the more recent social actor approach views undeclared work to result from the lack of citizens’ commitment to compliance and thus attempts to enhance vertical and horizontal trust. To evaluate these theories, 1,024 and 1,000 face-to-face interviews undertaken in 2007 and 2013 with a representative sample in the Czech Republic are analysed. The finding is that higher perceived penalties and risks of detection have no significant impact on the likelihood of conducting undeclared work. In contrast, the level of vertical and horizontal trust have a significant impact on engagement in undeclared work; the higher the vertical and horizontal trust, the lower is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work. The theoretical implication is that this evidence supports a new social actor approach. The policy implication is that the rational economic actor approach of increasing the penalties and risks of detection appears ineffective, and a new policy approach is proposed focused on improving vertical and horizontal trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Colin C. Williams & Gamze Oz Yalaman & Abbi M. Kedir, 2020. "Evaluating Policy Approaches Towards Tackling Undeclared Work in the Czech Republic," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 3, pages 396-417, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2020:i:3:p:396-417
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Colin C Williams, 2021. "Tackling Undeclared Self-Employment in South-East Europe: from Deterrents to Preventative Policy Measures," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 2, pages 280-298, July.
    2. Colin Williams & Brunilda Kosta, 2021. "Why do Consumers Buy from Informal Sector Suppliers in East-Central Europe? A Case Study of Home Repair and Renovation Services," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 134-152, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax morale; undeclared work; shadow economy; informal sector; Czech Republicomic Alternatives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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