IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nos/social/y2018i5p11-15.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Behavior Reactions Characteristic Of The Individuals With Egoistic And Altruistic Type Of Social Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Rakovets, Oksana

    (Lutsk Pedagogical College)

  • Kuznetsov, Illya

    (Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University)

  • Kotsan, Igor

    (Lessya Ukrainka Eastern European National University)

Abstract

Different types of social behavior are characterized by different behavioral reactions. Characteristics of selfish and altruistic social behavior are not clearly confirmed by the data of psychophysiological studies. Therefore, the purpose of the work is to identify the peculiarities of behavioral reactions of individuals with more expressed egoistic and altruistic social behavior, which are based on data of electroencephalographic research. 120 (aged 21±4 years) individuals took part in the study. As a result of complex psychological testing (based on Leary’s test) all subjects were divided into two groups - altruistic and egoistic. Registration of electrical activity was carried out in a model of collective interaction using the Stag Hunt Game and a specially developed model of social behavior Mini-Basketball. The number of elections for egoistic and altruistic stimulus and the reaction time to them were observed in the study. The stimulus "Rabbit" and "Throw" were considered as egoistic; “Stag" and "Pass" - as altruistic in accordance with the test methods. As a result, the frequency of choosing the type of stimuli corresponds to the social orientation of the individuals. The reaction time increases with the choice of the type of stimulus, which does not coincide with the type of social orientation of the subject.

Suggested Citation

  • Rakovets, Oksana & Kuznetsov, Illya & Kotsan, Igor, 2018. "Behavior Reactions Characteristic Of The Individuals With Egoistic And Altruistic Type Of Social Behavior," EUREKA: Social and Humanities, Scientific Route OÜ, issue 5, pages 11-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:nos:social:y:2018:i:5:p:11-15
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eu-jr.eu/social/article/viewFile/714/702.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bhatt, Meghana & Camerer, Colin F., 2005. "Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 424-459, August.
    2. Fabrizio De Vico Fallani & Vincenzo Nicosia & Roberta Sinatra & Laura Astolfi & Febo Cincotti & Donatella Mattia & Christopher Wilke & Alex Doud & Vito Latora & Bin He & Fabio Babiloni, 2010. "Defecting or Not Defecting: How to “Read” Human Behavior during Cooperative Games by EEG Measurements," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(12), pages 1-9, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sandra Ludwig & Julia Nafziger, 2011. "Beliefs about overconfidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 475-500, April.
    2. Manski, Charles F. & Neri, Claudia, 2013. "First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 232-254.
    3. Rineke Verbrugge & Ben Meijering & Stefan Wierda & Hedderik van Rijn & Niels Taatgen, 2018. "Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13(1), pages 79-98, January.
    4. Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Guida & Luca Polonio, 2016. "An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 177-201, March.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, 2011. "The framing of games and the psychology of play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 459-478.
    6. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
    7. Guidon Fenig & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yoram Halevy, 2018. "Piercing the 'Payoff Function' Veil: Tracing Beliefs and Motives," Working Papers tecipa-619, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    8. Kaushik Basu & Leonardo Becchetti & Luca Stanca, 2011. "Experiments with the Traveler’s Dilemma: welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(4), pages 575-595, October.
    9. Daniel McFadden, 2014. "The new science of pleasure: consumer choice behavior and the measurement of well-being," Chapters, in: Stephane Hess & Andrew Daly (ed.), Handbook of Choice Modelling, chapter 2, pages 7-48, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
    11. Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rilke, Rainer Michael & Walkowitz, Gari, 2013. "Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options," IZA Discussion Papers 7625, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Erik O. Kimbrough & Nikolaus Robalino & Arthur J. Robson, 2013. "The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1908R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2014.
    13. Sutter, Matthias & Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco, 2010. "Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games," Working Papers in Economics 430, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    14. Martin Dufwenberg & Simon Gaechter & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic Choice," Discussion Papers 2006-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    15. repec:cup:judgdm:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:79-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:4:p:844-897 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Simon Gächter & Elke Renner, 2010. "The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(3), pages 364-377, September.
    18. repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:2:p:230-245 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Karl Schlag & James Tremewan, 2021. "Simple belief elicitation: An experimental evaluation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 137-155, April.
    20. Christian Schmidt, 2006. "Quelques points de rencontre entre économistes et psychologues," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(2), pages 242-257.
    21. Sutter, Matthias & Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 395-410.
    22. Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco & Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Sutter, Matthias, 2016. "How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 265-285.
    23. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nos:social:y:2018:i:5:p:11-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Helen Klimashevska (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://eu-jr.eu/social .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.