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Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set

Author

Listed:
  • Øyvind Bøhren
  • Bernt Arne Ødegaard

Abstract

Using a data base which is exceptionally rich and accurate by international standards, this paper quantifies a wide range of ownership structure characteristics for all Oslo Stock Exchange firms in the period 1989–1997. Overall, we find that their ownership structures differ remarkably from those of other European firms. We speculate that a socialdemocratic rule and strong legal protection of stockholder rights may explain why the personal investment in Norwegian listed firms is so limited (low direct ownership), why the largest owner is so small (low concentration), and why the other major owners are so large (flat power structure). Our findings raise two questions about the viability of corporate governance systems in general. The first is whether delegated monitoring carried out by state bureaucrats and corporate managers is an effective disciplining mechanism. The second question is whether low ownership concentration produces strong managers and weak owners or whether the flat power structure facilitates joint monitoring by owners who are individually weak, but collectively strong.

Suggested Citation

  • Øyvind Bøhren & Bernt Arne Ødegaard, 2001. "Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 55-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:27:y:2001:p:55-86
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    File URL: http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_2001_a04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C. & Michalsen, Dag, 1999. "Distressed relationships: Lessons from the Norwegian banking crisis," CFS Working Paper Series 2000/01, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    2. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "The diversification cost of large, concentrated equity stakes. How big is it? Is it justified?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 56-72, June.
    2. Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2007. "Price differences between equity classes. Corporate control, foreign ownership or liquidity?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3621-3645, December.
    3. Rünger, Silke, 2011. "The effect of Germany's Tax Reform Act 2001 on corporate ownership: Insights from disposals of minority blocks," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 114, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    4. Randi Næs & Bernt Arne Ødegaard, 2008. "Liquidity and asset pricing: Evidence on the role of investor holding period," Working Paper 2007/11, Norges Bank.
    5. Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2017. "How long do equity owners hang on to their stocks?," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2017/6, University of Stavanger.
    6. Jørgensen, Kjell & Skjeltorp, Johannes & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2018. "Throttling hyperactive robots – Order-to-trade ratios at the Oslo Stock Exchange," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "Who moves stock prices? Monthly evidence," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/4, University of Stavanger.
    8. Jørgensen, Kjell & Skjeltorp, Johannes Atle & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2014. "Throttling hyperactive robots - Message to trade ratios at the Oslo Stock Exchange," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2014/3, University of Stavanger.
    9. Limei Che & Pingying Zhang, 2017. "The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 757-784, September.
    10. Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2017. "Is Household Diversification Increasing in Wealth? Norwegian Evidence," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2017/7, University of Stavanger.
    11. Randi Næs, 2004. "Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity," Working Paper 2004/6, Norges Bank.
    12. Che, Limei, 2018. "Investor types and stock return volatility," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 139-161.
    13. Hanafiah Hasin & Rahayu Mohd Sehat & Zaleha Mahat & Siti Fatimah Noor Minhad & Eka Fauzihardani, 2024. "Board Size and Corporate Performance in the Industrial Property Sector in Malaysia," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 16(3), pages 487-499.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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