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Exploring The Link Between Executive Compensation Package And Executives' Pay Satisfaction In Croatian Companies: An Empirical Study

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  • Darko Tipuric
  • Danica Bakotic
  • Marina Lovrincevic

Abstract

The executive compensation package can, and most often does, contain many elements. These elements have differing effects on executive motivation and risk taking propensity, and they impose different costs for the company. In that sense, the aim of this paper is to investigate the components of executive compensation packages in large Croatian companies as well as to identify the level of executives' satisfaction with their compensation packages. Our research results suggest that besides base salary, other components of executive compensation package are not adequately represented. Bonus is the most common form of variable pay, whereas stock options and stock grants are not included in executive compensation packages in large Croatian companies. Even though structure of executive compensation packages in large Croatian companies is, for the most part, not in line with theoretical postulates, top managers seem to be satisfied with their pay and other elements of their compensation package.

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  • Darko Tipuric & Danica Bakotic & Marina Lovrincevic, 2013. "Exploring The Link Between Executive Compensation Package And Executives' Pay Satisfaction In Croatian Companies: An Empirical Study," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 9(2), pages 7-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:7-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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