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Justification as a Means of Creating Legitimacy of a Punishment System

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  • Charles Noussair

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  • Charles Noussair, 2014. "Justification as a Means of Creating Legitimacy of a Punishment System," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 193-198, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201403)170:1_193:jaamoc_2.0.tx_2-e
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13817353577510
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mariana Blanco & Dirk Engelmann & Alexander Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2010. "Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 412-438, December.
    2. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    3. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
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