Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction
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- Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction," Discussion Papers in Economics 14193, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 383, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2013. "Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction," Munich Reprints in Economics 20127, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, 1993.
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- Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Morris M. Kleiner & Richard B. Freeman, 2000. "Who Benefits Most from Employee Involvement: Firms or Workers?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 219-223, May.
- Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2003. "Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 155-180, Winter.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ester Manna & Alessandro De Chiara, 2016. "Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent," UB Economics Working Papers 2016/346, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics.
- Lea Cassar, 2014.
"Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission,"
ECON - Working Papers
150, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2014.
- Lea Cassar, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Project Mission," CESifo Working Paper Series 6181, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lea Cassar, 2014. "Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives: experimental evidence," ECON - Working Papers 177, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Burdín, Gabriel & Halliday, Simon & Landini, Fabio, 2015.
"Third-Party vs. Second-Party Control: Disentangling the Role of Autonomy and Reciprocity,"
IZA Discussion Papers
9251, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Gabriel Burdin & Simon Halliday & Fabio Landini, 2015. "Third-Party vs. Second-Party Control: Disentangling the role of Autonomy and Reciprocity," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 15-12, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 2013. "Preventing abuse by controlling shareholders," Other publications TiSEM 8b719086-6332-459b-b046-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
More about this item
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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