Implications of Return-Free Tax Systems for the Structure of the Individual Income Tax
Many countries do not require all taxpayers to file an annual income tax return. Return-free systems shift some of the costs of operating the tax system from taxpayers to employers, other third parties, and the government. Return-free systems may work best when the tax system is simple: When the unit of taxation is the individual, the tax rate structure is flat, and there are few deductions and credits. The more the tax code is used to achieve tax and social policy goals other than simplification, the more difficult it may be to exempt most taxpayers from filing requirements.
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Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
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