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Optimal Capital Income Taxation and Redistribution

Author

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  • Ulrike Vogelgesang

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of agent heterogeneity on optimal capital income taxation. We discuss conditions for the optimality of zero capital income taxes in a multiperiod model with heterogeneous agents and explicitly derive the welfare effects of taxation depending on the distribution of the agents' characteristics. In particular, we show that the sign of the optimal capital income tax rate does not depend on the extent of inequality in goods endowments and productivities each by itself, but on a measure of inequality in their joint distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrike Vogelgesang, 2001. "Optimal Capital Income Taxation and Redistribution," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 412-434, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200108)57:4_412:ocitar_2.0.tx_2-l
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    Cited by:

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    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2003. "Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2475-2490, October.
    3. Fabian Kindermann & Dirk Krueger, 2022. "High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1 Percent? Lessons from a Life-Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 319-366, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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