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Jegybanki bejelentések és makroökonómiai stabilitás
[Central-bank announcements and macroeconomic stability]

Author

Listed:
  • Valentinyi, Ákos

Abstract

A jegybanki bejelentések nem pusztán információt közölnek a piac szereplőivel, hanem koordinálják a piaci szereplők várakozásait. Ezért akár ártatlannak tűnő jegybanki bejelentések is erős piaci reakciókat válthatnak ki. A tanulmány egy egyszerű modell keretei között mutatja meg, hogy ha a piac egy szereplője bizonytalan a makrogazdasági helyzetet illetően, akkor abban is a bizonytalan, hogy a többi piaci szereplő mit tud. Ezenkívül szereplőnk abban is bizonytalan, hogy a többi gazdasági szereplő tudja-e, hogy ő mit tud a makrogazdasági helyzetről. Sőt, ilyen helyzetben azt sem tudja biztosan, hogy a többiek tudják-e, hogy ő mit tud arról, hogy a többiek mit tudnak. Ekkor a jegybanki bejelentés, ha a piaci szereplők komolyan veszik, megszünteti a bizonytalanságot piacon. Ezzel a jegybank a helyzettől függően kiválthat vagy meg is előzhet spekulatív támadást. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: F31, D82.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentinyi, Ákos, 2005. "Jegybanki bejelentések és makroökonómiai stabilitás [Central-bank announcements and macroeconomic stability]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 811-824.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:801
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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