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Válságspirál, avagy a magyar bankok tőkevesztésének egy lehetséges értelmezése
[Crisis spiral, or: a possible interpretation of the loss of capital of die Hungarian banks]

Author

Listed:
  • Király, Júlia

Abstract

A monetáris szektor és a reálgazdaság kapcsolatát illetően, úgy tűnik, az elmélet ma bizonytalanabb, mint bármikor korábban. Egy szellemes, a korábbi keynesi, illetve friedmani megközelítésekhez képest alternatív magyarázat az úgynevezett Fisher-féle avagy adósság/deflációs spirál, amelyet újabban sikerrel alkalmaznak a pénzügyi közvetítők reálgazdasági válságok mélyülésében játszott szerepének elemzésekor. Tanulmányomban arra teszek kísérletet, hogy a Fisherspirál alapgondolatának alkalmazásával újraértelmezzem a magyarországi vállalati és bankszektor 1991ben bekövetkezett tőkevesztését, és néhány pesszimista következtetést fogalmazzak meg a közeljövővel kapcsolatban.*1

Suggested Citation

  • Király, Júlia, 1995. "Válságspirál, avagy a magyar bankok tőkevesztésének egy lehetséges értelmezése [Crisis spiral, or: a possible interpretation of the loss of capital of die Hungarian banks]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 819-837.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    4. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    5. Steinherr, A. & Huveneers, Ch., 1994. "On the performance of differently regulated financial institutions: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 271-306, January.
    6. Ben S. Bernanke, 1993. "Credit in the macroeconomy," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 18(Spr), pages 50-70.
    7. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gál, Erzsébet, 2011. "Is It Necessary to Regulate Local Governments’ Borrowing? – The Lessons of the Hungarian Case," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 56(1), pages 125-146.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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