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Intézményi bizalom és a döntések időhorizontja
[Institutional confidence and the time line of decision-making]

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  • Győrffy, Dóra

Abstract

A tanulmány fő kérdése, hogy alapvető bizonytalanság esetén miért lehetséges a hosszú távú döntéshozatal egyes társadalmakban, és miért válik uralkodóvá a rövid távú szemlélet másutt. A tanulmány a társadalomtudományok intézményekről való gondolkodásának elmélettörténeti áttekintésére támaszkodva egy olyan gondolati keretet alakít ki, amely az intézmények iránti bizalmatlanság, a szabálykerülés, a bizonytalanság és a rövid távú döntéshozatal közötti kapcsolatot írja le. Journal of Economics Literature (JEL) kód: B25, K42, O17.

Suggested Citation

  • Győrffy, Dóra, 2012. "Intézményi bizalom és a döntések időhorizontja [Institutional confidence and the time line of decision-making]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 412-425.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1302
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    Cited by:

    1. Csaba, László, 2013. "Kérdőjelek a közgazdaságtanban és oktatásában [Challenges in economic research and education]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 47-63.
    2. Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén? [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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