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Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University)

  • William V. Gehrlein

    (University of Delaware)

  • Fred S. Roberts

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts, 2022. "Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 1-6, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:93:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09851-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09851-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fishburn, Peter C., 1974. "Convex stochastic dominance with continuous distribution functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 143-158, February.
    2. Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), 2009. "The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-540-79128-7, July.
    3. Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn, 2003. "Fair Division Of Indivisible Items," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 147-180, September.
    4. Peter Fishburn & Ward Edwards, 1997. "Discount-neutral utility models for denumerable time streams," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 139-166, September.
    5. Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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