IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v65y2024i1d10.1007_s11151-024-09957-x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The 2023 Merger Guidelines and The Role of Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Michael A. Salinger

    (Boston University)

Abstract

Relying heavily on legal analysis, the 2023 Merger Guidelines argue for a fundamental shift in antitrust enforcement that places more emphasis on protecting competitors and less on protecting the beneficiaries of competition. It is up to courts, not economists, to ascertain whether this interpretation of antitrust law is correct. But economists can and should analyze the likely economic effects. Evidence that antitrust enforcement has permitted some markets to be overly concentrated justifies the tightening of horizontal merger enforcement that is signaled by these guidelines. Evaluating the elimination of double marginalization from vertical mergers as a part of an efficiency defense rather than as a primary economic effect reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the economics of vertical mergers. At a minimum, these guidelines will further damage the reputation of the DOJ and FTC among competition policy enforcers in other countries. A potentially more serious cost will be if foreign competition authorities use these guidelines to justify enforcing their own laws to protect inefficient domestic firms against foreign competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael A. Salinger, 2024. "The 2023 Merger Guidelines and The Role of Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 243-253, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09957-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09957-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-024-09957-x
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-024-09957-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Chen, Yongmin, 2001. "On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 667-685, Winter.
    3. Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, 2010. "The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 417-466.
    4. Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, 2014. "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 67-100.
    5. Orley C. Ashenfelter & Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2013. "The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 239-261, February.
    6. Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, 2011. "Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 17-32.
    7. Steven Tenn, 2011. "The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 65-82.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter L. Ormosi, 2017. "Post-merger price dynamics matter, so why do merger retrospectives ignore them?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-05, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Thomas Koch & Shawn W. Ulrick, 2021. "Price Effects Of A Merger: Evidence From A Physicians' Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 790-802, April.
    3. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Stéphane Turolla & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, 2017. "Retail Mergers and Food Prices: Evidence from France," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 469-509, September.
    4. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Stéphane Turolla & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, 2013. "The Impact of Retail Mergers on Food Prices : Evidence from France," Working Papers 2013-18, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Zack Cooper & Stuart V Craig & Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, 2019. "The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(1), pages 51-107.
    6. Robert Kulick, 2017. "Ready-to-Mix: Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Productivity," Working Papers 17-38, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    7. Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, 2014. "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 67-100.
    8. Daniel S. Hosken & Luke M. Olson & Loren K. Smith, 2018. "Do retail mergers affect competition? Evidence from grocery retailing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 3-22, March.
    9. Ralph B. Siebert, 2022. "What Determines Heterogeneous Merger Effects on Competitive Outcomes?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 217-256, March.
    10. Christos Genakos & Andreas Lamprinidis & James Walker, 2023. "Evaluating merger effects," CEP Discussion Papers dp1921, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    11. Holler, Emanuel & Rickert, Dennis, 2022. "How resale price maintenance and loss leading affect upstream cartel stability: Anatomy of a coffee cartel," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    12. Gaynor, Martin & Laudicella, Mauro & Propper, Carol, 2012. "Can governments do it better? Merger mania and hospital outcomes in the English NHS," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 528-543.
    13. Stephen Martin, 2012. "Market Structure and Market Performance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(2), pages 87-108, March.
    14. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Stéphane Turolla, 2022. "The Effect of Input Price Discrimination on Retail Prices: Theory and Evidence from France," Working Papers SMART 22-06, INRAE UMR SMART.
    15. Jonas Björnerstedt & Frank Verboven, 2016. "Does Merger Simulation Work? Evidence from the Swedish Analgesics Market," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 125-164, July.
    16. R. Forrest McCluer & Martha A. Starr, 2013. "Using Difference in Differences to Estimate Damages in Healthcare Antitrust: A Case Study of Marshfield Clinic," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 447-469, November.
    17. Stuart V. Craig & Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2021. "Mergers and marginal costs: New evidence on hospital buyer power," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 151-178, March.
    18. Charpin, Ariane & Piechucka, Joanna, 2021. "Merger efficiency gains: Evidence from a large transport merger in france," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    19. Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2015. "On The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers: A Theoretical Interpretation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 236-255, July.
    20. Nilsen, Øivind Anti & Sørgard, Lars & Ulsaker, Simen A., 2016. "Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 143-172.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09957-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.