IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v48y2016icp143-172.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?

Author

Listed:
  • Nilsen, Øivind Anti
  • Sørgard, Lars
  • Ulsaker, Simen A.

Abstract

This study applies a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). The theoretical predictions are that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms and at the same time no changes in the prices paid by consumers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions it is found that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices paid by the downstream firms to the merged firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Nilsen, Øivind Anti & Sørgard, Lars & Ulsaker, Simen A., 2016. "Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 143-172.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:48:y:2016:i:c:p:143-172
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716300765
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jushan Bai, 1997. "Estimation Of A Change Point In Multiple Regression Models," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(4), pages 551-563, November.
    2. Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, 2007. "Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 625-652.
    3. Orley C. Ashenfelter & Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2013. "The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 239-261, February.
    4. Bruce E. Hansen, 2001. "The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labour Productivity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 117-128, Fall.
    5. Manuszak, Mark D., 2010. "Predicting the impact of upstream mergers on downstream markets with an application to the retail gasoline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 99-111, January.
    6. Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, 2010. "The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 417-466.
    7. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 2005. "Bargining, Bundling, and Clout: The Portfolio Effects of Horizontal Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 573-595, Autumn.
    8. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    9. Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, 1999. "Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 15(3), pages 205-217, November.
    10. Céline Bonnet & Pierre Dubois, 2010. "Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 139-164, March.
    11. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2007. "Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 963-987, October.
    12. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
    13. Andrews, Donald W K, 1993. "Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(4), pages 821-856, July.
    14. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    15. Werden, Gregory J, 1996. "A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 409-413, December.
    16. Perron, Pierre, 1990. "Testing for a Unit Root in a Time Series with a Changing Mean," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 8(2), pages 153-162, April.
    17. Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, 2007. "Using Retail Data For Upstream Merger Analysis," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 689-715.
    18. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-430, March.
    19. von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, 1996. "Countervailing power revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 507-519, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rey, Patrick & Vergé, Thibaud, 2016. "Secret contracting in multilateral relations," TSE Working Papers 16-744, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2020.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Allain, Marie-Laure & Avignon, Rémi & Chambolle, Claire, 2020. "Purchasing alliances and product variety," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Symeonidis, George, 2010. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 230-243, May.
    3. Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, 2017. "Upstream horizontal mergers and vertical integration," Discussion Paper Series 2017_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Aug 2017.
    4. George Symeonidis, 2008. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 247-270, 03.
    5. Emanuele Bacchiega & Olivier Bonroy & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2018. "Contract contingency in vertically related markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 772-791, October.
    6. Walter Beckert, 2018. "An Empirical Analysis of Countervailing Power in Business-to-Business Bargaining," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 369-402, May.
    7. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2007. "Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 963-987, October.
    8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele, 2007. "Buyer power and quality improvements," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 45-61, June.
    9. Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, 2020. "Upstream horizontal mergers involving a vertically integrated firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 67-83, June.
    10. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Joel Sandonis, 2018. "Manufacturer Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-24, March.
    11. David Mills, 2013. "Countervailing Power and Chain Stores," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(3), pages 281-295, May.
    12. Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Isabel Teichmann, 2012. "The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1189-1201.
    13. Yonezawa, Koichi & Gomez, Miguel I. & Richards, Timothy J., 2018. "The Robinson-Patman Act and Vertical Relationships in Food Retailing," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274204, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Sara Fisher Ellison & Christopher M. Snyder, 2010. "Countervailing Power In Wholesale Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 32-53, March.
    15. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    16. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Klein, Gordon J. & Rickert, Dennis & Wey, Christian, 2021. "Vertical relations, pass-through, and market definition: Evidence from grocery retailing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    17. Tiago Pires & André Trindade, 2018. "Ex-post Evaluation of Mergers in the Supermarket Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 473-496, May.
    18. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2014. "Foreign Direct Investment Modes and Local Backward Linkages," CESifo Working Paper Series 4623, CESifo.
    19. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
    20. Sheldon, Ian M., 2017. "The Competitiveness Of Agricultural Product And Input Markets: A Review And Synthesis Of Recent Research," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 1-44, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Upstream merger; Non-linear prices; Vertical contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:48:y:2016:i:c:p:143-172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.