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The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2018–2019

Author

Listed:
  • Evan Gee

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Craig Peters

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Jeffrey M. Wilder

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

Abstract

This article highlights the economic analysis that underlay certain enforcement efforts of the Antitrust Division over the past year. The Division’s challenge of AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner expressly incorporated bargaining theory into the theory of harm; this provided for a rich theoretical framework for evaluating the merger’s impact. The Division also reached a settlement with Atrium Health that prevented the large hospital network from imposing contractual restrictions that undercut health insurers’ efforts to create tiered networks and other plans that promote competition among providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Evan Gee & Craig Peters & Jeffrey M. Wilder, 2019. "The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2018–2019," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(4), pages 537-550, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09726-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09726-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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